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A B S T R A C T   
This study focuses on fish quality and resource utilization at the ex-vessel level of the value chain. Substantial 
waste in the form of reduced fish quality is revealed for Atlantic cod landed by the coastal fleet in Norway, with 
approximately 30% of the sampled cod from 399 catches downgraded, implying reduced value of products in 
onshore processing. By using an objective quality index for individual catches in hedonic price modeling, we 
obtain new insights regarding the important role markets may play in sustainable utilization of marine resources. 
The econometric results indicate that the quality index had a rather modest effect on prices and that fishing 
methods is more important in price formation. These findings are attributed to a poorly performing ex-vessel 
market where asymmetric information regarding fish quality and the bargaining power of fishers distort the 
relationship between quality and price, with the result that fishers are not incentivized to deliver fish of good 
quality.   
1. Introduction 
In 2013, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United 
Nations [1] assessed that 89.5% of all marine fish stocks were fully 
fished (58.1%) or overfished (31.4%), and thus urged states to manage 
fisheries in a biologically sustainable way. In addition, the FAO [2] 
encouraged states to utilize fish stocks to contribute to the nutritional, 
social and economic value of fish, where preserving its quality is para-
mount. Fish of high quality provide consumers with safe and healthy 
meals with high nutritional value, as well as enjoyable eating experi-
ences, positively influencing their satisfaction and willingness to pay. 
This may in turn lead to increased value added and greater profits for the 
various actors along the value chain. However, fresh fish is highly 
perishable and spoils more rapidly than almost any other food. Thus, 
appropriate harvest and post-harvest handling and subsequent preser-
vation are crucial to “locking-in” the quality and nutritional attributes of 
fish, as well as reducing waste. Importantly, a decline in quality during 
harvest can never be regained in later stages of the value chain [3], 
implying that fishers play a crucial role in sustainable use of limited 
marine resources. 
Well-functioning ex-vessel markets play an important role in 
incentivizing fishers to land fish of high quality because in competitive 
markets prices should reflect the quality (and quantity) of landed fish. In 
addition, the most competitive buyers will be the ones that, over time, 
are the most capable of adding value to the fish they purchase and of 
gaining the highest returns from their customers and markets. Past 
research has shown that ex-vessel prices are affected by quality attri-
butes such as fish size [4–8], freshness [5] and overall quality grades [7, 
8]. It should be noted that in the case of direct sales, quality grades are 
usually self-reported [7,8] and they may be used deliberately to influ-
ence prices [9]. In some markets, quality grades may also be rather 
coarse grained as is the case for groundfish in Norway where fish quality 
is graded as just regular or downgraded [7]. 
Insights into the effect of quality on price have also been provided by 
a number of studies finding that fishing methods influence ex-vessel 
prices [5,7,10–12]. For example, Sogn-Grundvåg et al. [12], studying 
the ex-vessel market for frozen groundfish in Norway, found that cod 
and haddock caught with longlines gained 15% and 13.3% higher prices 
than fish caught with bottom trawling, respectively. Because fishing 
methods have been found to affect fish quality [13,14], it seems 
reasonable to assume that fishing methods represents useful quality 
signals to buyers. However, quality differences between vessels within 
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groups of vessels fishing with the same gear may be substantial due to 
variations in fishing tactics such as soaking time for gillnets and long-
lines [14–16] and the size of hauls when fishing with Danish seines and 
trawls [17–20]. Thus, fishing methods may conceal important variations 
in fish quality and prices gained between vessels fishing with the same 
gear. 
This study contributes to the literature by providing fine-grained 
insights into the relationships between fishing methods, fish quality 
and price at the ex-vessel level of the supply chain. More specifically, 
primary data were collected over a five-year period (2014–2018) by 
conducting on-site objective quality assessment of 399 catches of 
Atlantic cod landed by the coastal fleet in Norway using the catch 
damage index developed by Esaiassen et al. [21]. A second dataset was 
drawn from a database provided by the Norwegian Directorate of 
Fisheries containing details about the same catches such as prices, the 
size of fish, and the weight of the catch. By examining the effect of the 
objective fish quality in individual catches on prices it was possible to 
determine to what extent buyers had adopted quality-based pricing in 
this market. In this way, insights into the functioning of the marketplace 
and its role in incentivizing fishers to deliver high-quality fish through 
quality-based pricing is addressed. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Fish quality 
It is well-known that the quality of fish is influenced by the way in 
which they were caught and handled onboard the fishing vessel. Fishing 
methods such as trawling, gillnets, traps, Danish seines, trolling, long-
lines and handlines have all been found to affect fish quality, but to a 
variable degree [14,19,22]. The quality of landed fish may also vary 
between vessels fishing with the same gear, depending on variations in 
fishing tactics such as soaking time for gillnets and longlines [14,15,23], 
and onboard handling practices such as how fast the fish are bled [19]. 
Accordingly, econometric studies of factors affecting ex-vessel prices 
usually find that fishing methods influence prices, most likely reflecting 
quality differences [5,7,10,11]. 
The quality of the raw fish influences the share of high-value prod-
ucts that can be made from a catch [21,22,24–26]. Typical high-value 
products are “shiny” cod, fresh loins and primeira saltfish. However, 
when a catch contains fish of low quality, the share of high-value 
products is reduced, diminishing the value of the product mix as a 
whole. Depending on prices gained, this may have a negative influence 
on processors’ costs, revenues and profits. Thus, when considerable 
quantities of fish of low quality are landed, as observed here, there may 
be negative economic and social consequences for local communities, 
many of which are strongly dependent on fisheries. 
The Norwegian Food Safety Authority enforces technical regulations 
regarding the catching and handling of fish on board the vessels. 
Importantly, it is explicitly stated that the fish’s blood should be drained. 
Further, fish that were dead when being taken onboard should be stored 
separately. However, compliance with these regulations is low during 
the peak season [27]. Regarding sustainable fishing, the northeast 
Atlantic cod has been certified by the Marine Stewardship Council since 
2010. 
2.2. The coastal groundfish fishery and ex-vessel market 
The Norwegian fishery for Atlantic cod is the most valuable fishery in 
Norway. In 2018, the coastal fleet landed about 193,000 tons of cod at 
an ex-vessel value of NOK 3.3 billion (EUR 344 million). The fishing fleet 
involved is diverse, ranging from small and medium-sized to large ves-
sels fishing with handlines, gillnets, longlines and Danish seines, deliv-
ering fresh catches to local fish buyers daily. The coastal groundfish 
fishery was open access until 1989, when it was closed due to the dire 
state of the Northeast-Atlantic cod stock. Individual vessel quotas were 
awarded based on previous fishing activity. Since 1990, the system has 
developed into one characterized by bounded transferability of fishing 
quotas [28] and many vessels now hold relatively large quota portfolios, 
often combining different groundfish species such as Atlantic cod, 
haddock and pollock with pelagic fish such as herring and mackerel. In 
order to catch all the different species with sometimes overlapping 
seasons, incentives for intense and swift fishing tactics are created, 
where fish quality may be compromised by the quantity of fish landed 
[29]. 
The ex-vessel sale of wild-caught fish in Norway is organized by sales 
organizations, owned by fishers. According to the Raw Fish Act, these 
have the exclusive right to coordinate sales and set minimum prices to 
secure the fishers a price that reflects the market prices and to avoid 
powerful buyers using their bargaining power to set prices that are too 
low for small independent fishers. Under the Raw Fish Act, buyers may 
downgrade fish based on its quality and reduce the price up to 40% 
compared with the minimum price. 
Fishers are free to choose where to land the fish. However, vessels 
reach varies in terms of how far they can, within reasonable costs and 
time, travel to land their daily catches. Smaller local vessels typically 
land their catches in their home community, where a small number of 
buyers are usually present. However, during the peak season some 
smaller vessels chooses a port of call close to the fishing grounds, which 
may be far away from their home port. Larger coastal vessels have wider 
reach and may shop around for the best prices but may also be loyal to 
specific buyers based on informal agreements and relationships. Fish 
buyers compete for fish by offering competitive prices but also by 
creating relationships and commitment by minority ownership in ves-
sels, loans, and various other services [30]. 
The catches are landed directly to fish buyers’ processing plants, 
where the fish are gutted, weighed and processed into a wide variety of 
products. Fish processing plants can broadly be categorized based on 
their main type of end products, that is, the production of fillets (fresh or 
frozen), fresh whole gutted fish, salted fish and dry-salted fish (clipfish), 
and stockfish. Most specialize in one type of production, but often 
combine with packing fresh whole fish. Fish buyers may also buy cod 
from oceangoing trawlers and longliners, but they mainly freeze their 
catches as headed and gutted onboard in order to make longer trips 
(typically around 3–4 weeks) to utilize their fishing and storage capacity 
to the max [12]. Frozen headed and gutted cod may be used in onshore 
processing, but mainly for salted products. It should be noted that the 
frozen cod is a commodity sold in the global market and is generally 
more expensive than the fresh cod from the coastal fleet [31]. 
The organization of the ex-vessel market with direct sales has im-
plications for the bargaining power of fishers and fish buyers, potentially 
affecting prices [9,32,33]. This can be explained by the open systems 
perspective, which implies that fishers and fish buyers are mutually 
dependent on each other to stay in business. Fishers depend on someone 
to purchase their catches so that they can pay for fuel, fishing gear, 
wages and other input factors. At the same time, fish buyers depend on 
fish, skilled workers and other input factors for their production. This 
influences the power balance between fishers and fish buyers, because 
dependence is inversely proportional to power [34]. For example, a fish 
buyer highly dependent on fish supplies has, in principle, little power 
over the fisher. 
Important here is the fact that buyers’ investments in production 
capacity are influenced by changes in yearly quotas and are adapted to 
manage a high throughput in the peak season (February to April). Figs. 1 
and 2 shows how cod landings from the coastal fleet vary across years 
and months, respectively. 
As Fig. 1 demonstrates, yearly cod catches fluctuate substantially 
with variations in the cod stock. Moreover, Fig. 2 shows how cod 
landings vary during the year and illustrates that production capacity is 
adapted to the peak landings early in the year. Investments in produc-
tion capacity are usually made in periods with rising cod quotas, 
resulting in overcapacity in periods when quotas are in decline [35]. 
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This tendency to invest in excess capacity is well described by Mac-
Donald and Mazany [36], who studied the Canadian Atlantic fishing 
industry, where investments in capacity were driven by anticipated 
future profits based on actual profits, caused by increases in landings 
and high market prices. Nevertheless, as common wisdom states, 
“nothing grows into heaven,” and this includes fish landings and prices. 
Thus, most of the time, the onshore processing sector has substantial 
excess capacity, implying strong dependency on supplies. By contrast, 
and as noted above, previous overcapacity in the fishing fleet has been 
substantially reduced through policy interventions. Fish buyers’ strong 
dependency on supplies means that fishers have substantial bargaining 
power. This can be illustrated by comparing the operating margin of the 
coastal fleet and the onshore processing sector, presented in Fig. 3. Fig. 3 
shows that the average profitability of the coastal fleet was substantially 
higher than for the processing sector, in particular for the last three years 
covered by the graph. For six of the 11 years covered, the average 
profitability for the onshore processing sector was negative. 
Interestingly, in 2009, when the effects of the financial crisis hit 
important seafood markets with falling demand and prices, bargaining 
power shifted from fishers to fish buyers. As described by Sogn-Grund-
våg and Henriksen [9], inspectors from the Norwegian Directorate of 
Fisheries revealed that fish buyers applied quality downgrading without 
objective reasons [37], indicating that quality downgrading was used to 
reduce prices. This is also indicated by the narrow gap in profitability 
between fishers and processors in 2010 as shown in Fig. 3. 
2.3. The quality assessment 
The catch-damage-index (CDI) was developed by Esaiassen et al. 
[21] as a tool for processing plants to determine the quality of catches 
based on the expected value of their end products. However, to the best 
of our knowledge, the CDI has not been applied by fish buyers. But the 
index has been used for research and development purposes such as 
comparing quality variations caused by variations in fishing tactics; see 
e.g., [15,17]. 
Between 2014 and 2018, quality assessment was conducted on 399 
catches delivered by 169 different coastal vessels to four different pro-
cessing plants in Northern Norway. The assessment was conducted in 
February and March, which are the peak months in the coastal cod 
fishery in Norway. Two assessors from a research institute visited one 
processing plant at a time and worked from about 8AM until midnight, 
or as long as there were vessels coming in to land their catches. When 
one catch had been assessed, the next one in line was chosen, but catches 
with less than 50 fish were not assessed. In addition, because the ma-
jority of vessels fished with gillnets, vessels fishing with handlines, 
longlines or Danish seines would be chosen over gillnetters when they 
arrived at the same time as gillnetters. 
The assessment was performed on individual fish picked from the 
process line after the fish had been gutted. The fish coming through the 
process line were mixed in terms of quality and size because it is not 
conventional for fishers to sort fish by size or quality onboard the vessel. 
Thus, in order to ensure that fish of different sizes and qualities were 
Fig. 1. Cod landings by the coastal fleet for the period 2008–2018. 
Source: Elaborated from Directorate of Fisheries (2020). 
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Fig. 2. Average monthly cod landings by the coastal fleet for 2008–2018. 
Source: Elaborated from Directorate of Fisheries (2020). 
Fig. 3. Average earnings before interests and tax (EBIT)/total revenues for the coastal fleet and the onshore processing sector from 2008 to 2018. 
Source: Vessel profitability elaborated from Directorate of Fisheries (2020); processors’ profitability elaborated from own data. 
G. Sogn-Grundvåg et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Marine Policy 127 (2021) 104449
5
randomly picked the following selection rule was followed: when the 
first fish had been assessed, the second fish was the next fish passing by 
on the process line, and so on. The quality assessment was a time- 
consuming exercise, the two assessors needing about 1–2 h to assess 
50 cod. 
Between 25 and 184 (53 on average) fish were picked from each 
catch and assessed using the CDI (For other applications of the CDI, see 
e.g., [13,15,17]). All visible damage to fish was registered in accordance 
with the predefined categories in the CDI,1 that is: “dead in gear”, 
“gear-related damage”, “bruises”, “gaffing damage”, “poorly bled”, “skin 
abrasion” and “pressure injuries”. The registered damage was scored as 
“0” (flawless), “1” (moderate) and “2” (serious) for every category 
except “dead in gear”, which was regarded as a form of serious damage 
(2). If the damage reduced the quality of the final product but did not 
compromise the value of the end product, a moderate flaw (1) was 
registered. If the damage was severe and solely responsible for down-
grading, a serious flaw (2) was registered. Downgrading affect the value 
of the output mix in onshore processing negatively in that the share of 
high-value products such as fresh loins or primeira saltfish is reduced 
[21]. 
The average size of catches by fishing methods varied substantially, 
with catches from Danish seines averaging 6789 kg, almost 20 times 
more than the average for handlines (351 kg), illustrating considerable 
differences in catching capacity between vessel groups. 
2.4. Model and econometric analysis 
To examine the influence of fish quality on the price of fresh Atlantic 
cod, we followed the hedonic price modeling literature [6,11,38,39]. 
Hedonic price modeling relies on characteristics theory, which assumes 
that consumers derive utility directly from the quality attributes 
inherent in a good [40,41]. Thus, the actual price of a good can be 
considered as the sum of the implicit prices of those attributes [41]. This 
indicates that the price of cod depends on its characteristics, such as its 
quality and fish size [4,5,7,42]. Fish prices may, however, also be 
influenced by factors such as the size of the catch and the size of a 
vessel’s quota, implying bargaining power as indicated above. Past 
research has found that the quality of cod is influenced by fishing 
methods [13,14,43]. Thus, to avoid multicollinearity and 
over-specification, the quality index and dummies for fishing methods 
are not included in the same models. 
In previous research, hedonic price modeling has used either the 
linear price or the logarithmic price as the dependent variable. Our test 
results, based on Vuong’s non-nested likelihood ratio test [44], revealed 
that the model with the logarithmic price as the dependent variable 
fitted the data better than the model with linear price formulation. 
Accordingly, the two models, one including the quality index (Model A) 
and the other including dummies for fishing methods (Model B), are 
expressed as follows: 
log(Pricei) =a0 + a1Qualityi+ b1log(Transaction Quantityi)
+ b2log(Yearly Catch Quantityi)+ c1Fish Size1i








(Model A)  
log(Pricei) =a0 + a1Handlinei + a2Longlinei + a3Danish Seinei
+ b1log(Transaction Quantityi)
+ b2log(Yearly Catch Quantityi)+ c1Fish Size1i








(Model B)  
where i indexes transactions and log is the natural logarithmic function; 
The error term Residual captures any other unobserved factors that may 
affect prices; the dependent variable, Price, is the price of cod per kilo-
gram. In Model A, Quality is the share of downgraded fish in each catch. 
In Model B, the three fishing methods, Handline, Longline and Danish 
Seine, are dummies, with gillnet as the base. The same control variables 
are incorporated in the two models, that is: Transaction-Quantity repre-
senting the volume of each transaction in kilograms; Yearly-Catch- 
Quantity for the total yearly catch of cod for each vessel; the product 
form dummies, H&G and Whole, for cod landed as headed and gutted 
and whole fish, respectively, with gutted cod with head on as the base. 
The Year dummies were included in the model to control for any yearly 
variations in prices with 2014 as the base year. The monthly dummy, 
March, controls for price differences between February and March. We 
set Buyer dummies with Buyer-4 (the largest one) as the base. 
As the dependent variable is expressed in logarithmic form, the 
estimated coefficient for Quality is interpreted as a1 percent changes in 
price as a result of a 0.01-unit (one percentage point) change in Quality. 
The quantity variables are in the logarithmic form and their coefficients 
are interpreted as elasticities. For example, a 1% change in Trans-
action–Quantity led to a b1% change in price. For the dummy variables, 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the econometric models.  
Variable Description Mean SD 
Price NOK per kilogram 12.55 2.789 
Transaction-Quantity Kilogram 2512 4678 
Yearly-Catch-Quantity Kilogram 247,020 287,013 
log (Price)  2.502 0.247 
Quality  0.332 0.191 
log (Transaction-Quantity)  6.880 1.427 
log (Yearly-Catch-Quantity)  11.82 1.162 
Fish size 1 2.5–6 kg 0.480  
Fish size 2 More than 6 kg 0.361  
Fish-Size 3 (base) Less than 2.5 kg 0.159  
Gillnets (base)  0.579  
Handlines  0.093  
Longlines  0.120  
Danish seiners  0.207  
Gutted with head (base)  0.130  
H&G Gutted without head 0.136  
Whole Whole fish 0.734  
Buyer 1  0.143  
Buyer 2  0.325  
Buyer 3  0.239  
Buyer 4 (base)  0.293  
2014 (base)  0.120  
2015  0.195  
2016  0.259  
2017  0.307  
2018  0.120  
February (base)  0.579  
March  0.421   
1 The category of “biting injuries” from the original CDI was not included 
because such damage hardly occurred in our samples. It should also be noted 
that the CDI does not include flaws such as soft flesh and fillet gaping, because 
these are rarely visible until several days after a fish has been landed. Soft flesh 
and gaping may have a negative effect on the quality of fresh fillets and whole 
fresh fish targeted for restaurants and fish counters in supermarkets. In addi-
tion, the CDI does not include the condition factor of the fish, which may vary 
depending on the fishing method used. For example, cod caught by gillnets are 
usually larger and in better condition than cod caught by longlines [14,49,50]. 
Large and well-conditioned cod are usually preferred for the production of 
saltfish and clipfish. 
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the estimated parameters are percentage changes in prices when the 
dummy variables change from zero to one. 
2.5. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables included 
in the econometric models. 
Table 1 shows that the average size of catches across all vessels was 
2512 kg, and that the average yearly landing by individual vessels was 
247,020 kg. Table 1 also shows the variable Quality, with an average 
share of downgraded fish of 33.2%.2 The reported means of each dummy 
variable are the number of observations (transactions) within each 
category as a proportion of the total number of observations for the 
category. For example, handlines accounted for 9.3% of the total num-
ber of catches for all fishing methods during the sample period. The 
mean of the buyer dummies shows that Buyer-4, the largest buyer, 
accounted for 29.3% of all transactions in the sample.3 
3. Results 
Table 2 presents the econometric results for Models A and B. The 
adjusted R2 value is 0.88 for Model A and 0.89 for Model B, indicating 
that most of the variations in prices are explained by the explanatory 
variables. For each model, the robust clustered standard errors are 
applied to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the 
error terms and clustering for different buyers. To assess whether mul-
ticollinearity is a problem in the models, the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) was computed for each variable. The values of the VIF are well 
below the recommended threshold of 10 [45], indicating that multi-
collinearity does not affect the validity of the regression models. 
Model A in Table 2 shows that the coefficient of Quality is significant 
and negative, indicating that an increase in the quality index, which 
means a reduction in quality, leads to lower prices, indicating that 
quality-based pricing is present. However, the effect of quality on price 
is rather modest. A 0.01-unit (one percentage point) change in the 
quality index leads to 1.24% change in price. Taking the mean of the 
quality index (0.332, see Table 1) into account, a 0.01-unit change 
means a 3.3% increase in the quality index. In other words, if the share 
of downgraded cod for a catch increases by 3.3%, it leads to a 1.24% 
reduction in price. 
The estimates for the size of catches (Transaction–Quantity) and 
yearly catches by individual vessels (Yearly–Catch–Quantity) are not 
significant, indicating that the buyers were unwilling to pay more to 
attract vessels with large catches and quotas. The largest fish size (larger 
than 6 kg) gained a 5.3% price premium compared to fish smaller than 
2.5 kg (the base). The estimate for cod in the medium-sized category 
(2.5–6 kg), was not significantly different from small cod. For the buyer 
dummies, only the estimate for Buyer–3, the second largest buyer, is 
significant and positive, indicating that buyer 3 paid higher prices than 
the largest buyer, Buyer–4 (the base), holding other factors constant. 
Model A also indicates that whole fish and cod gutted without head did 
not gain higher prices than other product forms. The year dummies were 
all significant and positive, reflecting that price has increased over time. 
The dummy for March is significant and positive compared to the base 
(February). 
Model B in Table 2 show that the estimates for the dummies for 
fishing methods were all significant and positive. Compared to cod 
caught by gillnet, the buyers paid 6.88% more for cod caught by 
handline, 7.63% more for cod caught by longline, and 8.8% more for cod 
caught by Danish seine. 
For the other variables, Model B provides similar estimation results 
as in Model A, with the exception of buyer dummies. In Model B, all the 
three buyer dummies are significant and positive. Compared to the 
largest buyer (the base), the three smaller buyers are willing to pay 
between 2.5% and 5.7% more for cod, holding other variables such as 
fish size and fishing methods constant. 
Overall, Model B fits the data better than Model A. The R2 is slightly 
higher for Model B, and fishing methods in Model B seems to better 
capture the influence of fish quality on prices than does the quality index 
in Model A. In addition, all the estimates for the buyer dummies are 
significant in Model B, whereas only one of the buyer dummies is sig-
nificant in Model A. 
4. Discussion 
The results of the quality assessments indicated that a high share 
(30%) of the Atlantic cod in the assessed catches was downgraded, 
representing a substantial waste of quality compromising the value of 
the final products in onshore processing. Despite of this, the econometric 
results showed that the quality index had a rather modest effect on 
prices. The results indicate that fishing method, an important indicator 
of fish quality, is more important for price formation. This is interesting 
because fishing method is a general characteristic of groups of catches 
and because the quality of fish may vary substantially between catches 
landed with the same fishing method. At the same time, the results also 
show that fish caught by Danish seines gained better prices than catches 
from vessels fishing with handlines, and almost the same price as fish 
caught by longline despite the substantially better quality of fish using 
the latter two methods. Why do not buyers penalize fishers by lowering 
prices for individual catches with low-quality fish and vice versa? 
First, the rather modest influence of the quality index on prices may 
be related to buyers’ lack of information of the quality of fish in indi-
vidual catches. Typically, the quality of cod is not assessed by buyers 
Table 2 
Econometric results from estimating the hedonic price models.   
Model A Model B 
Variable Estimate SE  Estimate SE  
Intercept  1.8072  0.0976 ***  1.8019  0.0488 *** 
Quality  − 0.1240  0.0531 **      
Handline       0.0688  0.0156 *** 
Longline       0.0763  0.0132 *** 
Danish seine       0.0880  0.0201 *** 
log (Transaction- 
Quantity)  
0.0162  0.0124   0.0100  0.0115  
log (Yearly-Catch- 
Quantity)  
0.0113  0.0121   0.0049  0.0109  
Fish size 1  -0.0041  0.0207   0.0128  0.0192  
Fish size 2  0.0530  0.0280 **  0.0658  0.0276 ** 
Buyer 1  0.0126  0.0166   0.0442  0.0208 ** 
Buyer 2  0.0234  0.0235   0.0576  0.0283 ** 
Buyer 3  0.0167  0.0053 ***  0.0251  0.0068 *** 
Whole  − 0.0001  0.0363   -0.0046  0.0231  
H&G  − 0.0125  0.025   -0.0067  0.0102  
2015  0.2808  0.0228 ***  0.2864  0.0221 *** 
2016  0.4742  0.0287 ***  0.4872  0.0338 *** 
2017  0.6174  0.0151 ***  0.6331  0.0210 *** 
2018  0.7290  0.0339 ***  0.7408  0.0378 *** 
March  0.0374  0.0199 *  0.0450  0.0219  
Adj.R2  0.8823     0.8904    
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, 
respectively. SE denotes the clustered robust standard error. 
2 This percentage differs slightly from the 30% downgraded fish reported 
from the quality assessment. This is due to the discrepant number of lines in the 
landing notes for different catches (each line represents one size category, 
which may differ between catches).  
3 In order to prevent the four buyers from becoming identifiable, we refrain 
from providing further details about them. 
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during unloading.4 This may be explained by the fact that this process is 
time-consuming making it costly to conduct reliable and trustworthy 
quality assessments of individual catches following the CDI protocol. It 
also requires trained assessors, who should be independent to ensure 
that assessments are trustworthy, which is also costly. It should also be 
noted that during the peak season, the logistics of unloading vessels is 
put under considerable pressure. Assessing all catches would add to this 
pressure and delay onshore gutting and processing. Simpler quality 
checks with a small number of fish or focusing on just a few important 
criteria such as whether the fish were properly bled take less time, but 
are less reliable, and thus with substantial potential for disagreements 
between fishers and buyers. Thus, with insufficient information about 
the quality of individual catches, buyers seem to use fishing methods as a 
proxy for quality in their pricing, at least for catches from vessels fishing 
with gillnets, handlines and longlines. 
Second, the ex-vessel market for fresh cod is organized with direct 
sales, implying that prices are a result of negotiations and bargaining 
between buyers and sellers. Here, buyers’ strong dependency on fishers 
for supplies implies that fishers enjoy a strong bargaining position. In 
fear of losing supplies, buyers may be reluctant to reduce prices for poor- 
quality fish in individual catches. That fish buyers are hesitant to 
penalize fishers by lowering prices for low-quality fish has been 
observed in other fisheries [36,46]. As long as buyers pay similar prices 
for fish of high and low quality, there are no economic incentives for 
fishers to increase the quality of their catches. In fact, for fishers, eco-
nomic incentives work in the opposite direction, that is, to reduce fishing 
costs by for example longer soaking time for gillnets, and larger hauls for 
Danish seine, lowering the quality of the landed fish, but increasing 
catch size and thus profits. 
This situation may be described as a “social dilemma,” that is, one 
where seemingly rational individual behaviors lead to circumstances 
where everyone is worse off than they otherwise would have been [47]. 
When a fisher uses his or her bargaining power to gain high prices for 
poor-quality fish, there are lower opportunity costs related to reduced 
quality and revenues associated with swift and intense fishing tactics. 
Thus, incentives to reduce costs may prevail, which is rational because it 
enhances profitability. It is also rational for fish buyers to compete 
fiercely to secure supplies, and in such a way compensate for low mar-
gins with a higher quantity. The results of these individually rational 
behaviors are that Norwegian processors suffer from a poor reputation, 
lower prices and lost customers in high-end markets. This in turn jeop-
ardize the economic performance of onshore processors, undermining 
their ability to pay good prices for good-quality cod and also affecting 
fishers’ future economic performance negatively. 
Given that fishers can influence the quality of their catches through 
changes in fishing tactics such as soaking time and haul size [14–16], 
price incentives may lead to improved fish quality. Auction markets with 
many sellers and buyers imply efficient markets and have the advantage 
that bargaining power carry no weight [48]. In addition, display auc-
tions where fish are weighed, graded by size and quality by a neutral 
auction house should minimize information asymmetry. However, 
display auctions may also have unwanted consequences as they may 
lead to centralization of fish sales, which may disfavor small and less 
mobile fishing vessels and fish buyers located far from the nearest 
auction. 
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